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As a consequence of neoliberalism, employment has become increasingly 
precarious and informal, sitting outside of traditional organizational contexts. 
There is a need to better understand how these structures emerge and, 
importantly, how workers can also adapt to challenge these shifts. This article is 
a study of a labour dispute between Philadelphia taxicab drivers and the 
governmental regulatory body. The dispute was centered around the 
implementation of surveillance technologies to regulate and control the industry 
and the drivers’ working practices which they considered to be de-
professionalizing and an infringement of their liberty. The drivers resisted 
through traditional organizing, legal challenges, and creating unconventional 
alliances. We argue that this labour dispute should be seen in the wider context 
of how a neoliberal political economy emerges and is maintained – in this case 
not by capital, but by the state. The article is a longitudinal case-study covering 
the period from 2004 to 2011. As such, it is a prologue to later technologically 
driven transformations in the taxicab industry (such as ride-hailing apps) that 
have further exacerbated precarity among the workforce. 
 







Taxis are often the first point of contact when entering a city, at the airport or the 
train station. Taxis are therefore an important mobile gateway to cities. They are 
also an important form of urban transport in their own right. As such they are 
sites of contestation, ideologically defined, and appropriated as a terrain within 
which power struggles play out. In this article we explore how a struggle over 
the regulation and surveillance of taxicabs is emblematic of the ways in which 
neoliberalism shapes and embeds urban environments, organizations, work and 
social relationships. 
 
This article examines a labour dispute that begins with the introduction of Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) in every taxicab in the city of Philadelphia. We use 
this to explore how technology and regulation were used to establish 
surveillance systems that were designed to condition and control work.  These 
systems replace formal systems of (micro) management and so become a form of 
management by technology. In this case the GPS systems were intended to 
surveil the drivers, as they interacted with the city. This led to a dispute between 
the drivers (as represented by the Taxi Workers Alliance of Pennsylvania) and 
the regulatory body (the Philadelphia Parking Authority) which began with the 
takeover of regulatory responsibilities by the PPA. As we will discuss, the 
formation of the Taxi Workers Alliance highlights the complex nature of 
collective action in the post-industrial context. 
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Weaver (2016: 3) argues that, in Philadelphia, ‘neoliberal ideas interacted with 
the slow-moving processes of deindustrialization, racial change and the logic of 
coalition building’. As such, the events of this case study are embedded within a 
broader process of revitalization (a process certainly still ongoing) through 
neoliberalism within the city of Philadelphia which has exacerbated inequality as 
the city has transitioned into a ‘bifurcated corporate region’ (Weaver, 2016: 
197). The city of Philadelphia itself, in the case study presented here, becomes 
the spatial mechanism through which technology is given agency over the 
taxicab drivers as a method of regulating and controlling a disparate workforce.  
 
All surveillance systems are located in a particular economic, cultural, political, 
and historical context (Lyon, 1994). In this article we establish this by examining 
how the system of surveillance was enacted within the context of 'urban 
renewal' and urban degradation, and how it was justified by recourse to 
discourses of rationality, safety, and market regulation. Lorey (2015) explains 
how fear and insecurity, in a neoliberal system, are constructed as a mechanism 
of control where domination is enacted by promises of protection through 
calculability and regulation. However, in doing so, there must be a discursive 
construction of those to be protected and those to be protected from. Here, taxi-
drivers felt harassed by the loss of privacy and independence, and that the 
regulation and GPS undermined notions of professionalism by placing a 
technological 'authority' ahead of human experience and accumulated 
knowledge. We explore how this was endured and resisted–albeit 
unsuccessfully. As Brenner and Theodore (2002: 368) argue, 'the overarching 
goal of such neoliberal urban policy experiments is to mobilize the city space as 
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an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption 
practices’. Here we relate the use of surveillance technology and the dispute to 
the conscious attempt to 'Disneyfy' (Bryman, 2004) Philadelphia as a means of 
transforming the city for the purposes of consumption and elite convenience. 
 
There are two interrelated central arguments developed here. First, 
neoliberalism as policy results in both the justification of using technological 
means of micro-managing regulation, and the increased precarity of labour 
which significantly complicates efforts to challenge the regulation. Neoliberalism 
confines the freedom of the worker in both ways. Second, neoliberalism as a 
discourse legitimates increased inequality through the degradation and de-
professionalisation of labour, and the othering of precarious workers is then 
used to exacerbate social divisions with the consumer whose interests and body 
are to be protected. In both arguments, precarity is an aspect of neoliberal 
governing (Lorey, 2015). This case study is temporally located after the 
emergence of urban neoliberalism as documented by Weaver (2016) but before 
the explosion of the role of technology in the ‘gig’ economy as evidenced by ride-
sharing mobile phone applications such as Uber and Lyft. The dispute over 
worker rights, regulation and technology documented here prefigure and 
provide context to later disputes within the taxicab industry and other industries 
impacted by an increasing shift towards casualisation. Streeck (2017: lix) argues 
for the importance of analysing processes as everything is ‘always moving along 
a path’. Therefore, we can only understand today if ‘we know how it looked 
yesterday and where it might be heading’ (Streeck, 2017: lix). This particular 
case study provides a vivid illustration of the implementation of regulation via 
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technology and the difficulties of resistance within the context of precarity and 
ambiguous power structures. A case study and documentary analysis approach 
enables an analysis which encompasses both an appreciation of the lived 
personal experience of these abstract processes as well as an analysis of the 
discursive justifications by the various stakeholders. 
  
The article is structured as follows. First, we provide a background discussion 
defining neoliberalism and precarity and consider organized resistance within 
this context. Second, we briefly discuss the methods and sources used here. We 
then contextualise the case with reference to urban renewal and post-industrial 
degradation in Philadelphia. The following sections lay out the narrative of the 
case study, examining the regulation, resistance and limited success that 
followed. There is then a discussion and conclusion.  
 
Neoliberalism, precarious labour and resistance 
 
Hanlon defines the key elements of neoliberalism as being threefold: to intervene 
to create the basic conditions under which the market can 'spontaneously' 
operate; the prioritization of competition in economic relationships; and the 
necessity of elite leadership (Hanlon, 2016: 186). These three elements are 
important. The mythos of 'free' markets belies that they are socially constructed 
institutions that are highly sensitive to regulatory and legal variations (Tataryn, 
2016)–and that the regulatory regime itself embeds market behaviour (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002). Notions of competition are used to rhetorically justify that 
consumers needs must be met and is at the same time the mechanism of 
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achieving efficiency within the market (Harvey, 2005). And, competition requires 
both experts and authorities to provide regulation (Davies, 2016), which elites 
provide via political mechanisms through which institutions are ideologically 
disciplined. Neoliberalism should, then, be conceived of as a 'logic' and 
'technology of governing' whose central problem is to 'administer people for 
self-mastery' in the pursuit of profit (Ong, 2007: 3-4). Despite the rhetoric to the 
contrary from elites, neoliberalism does not advance equality but, rather, 
reinscribes, intensifies and creates injustices and inequality (Bradley and Luxton, 
2010). 
 
Neoliberalism has led to substantial changes in economy and society that have 
been 'driven by the transformation of production processes, the rights connected 
with them and, above all, the deliberate governance strategies of capitalism’ 
(Bove et al., 2017: 5). As a consequence, employment has become more 
temporary and ephemeral. Work is increasingly located outside of the 
organizational contexts that had–in a prior era–located industrial relations in 
relatively stable and settled patterns. There has been a systematic and intended 
reduction in labour power as the modes of production have turned away from 
Fordism, and economic policy away from Keynsianism (Neilson and Rossiter, 
2008).  
 
Precarity–a now well-established concept (Bove et al., 2017)–is the deliberate 
repositioning and conditioning of the worker in relationship to the market as a 
consequence of neoliberalism. It can be theorized in various ways, but of 
relevance here are both the decline of traditional labour unions and 'the 
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emergence of new forms of political struggle and solidarity that reach beyond 
the traditional organizational models' (Bove et al., 2017: 5). This is also a central 
problematizing idea, as we explore resistance to the deracinatory effects of 
increased precarity. Yet these transformations have created a paradoxical 
situation where the traditional modes of organizational control over labour 
have–at least in part–been lost: and so, if a worker sits outside an organization 
they cannot be controlled as they once were within an organization. However, as 
we argue here, this seeming paradox is resolved as the mechanisms of social 
control have adapted to the post-Fordist organizational condition, while 
reproducing the essential elements. 
In this case, this is achieved via two interrelated mechanisms: technological and 
spatial. The first is the use of what McCormack and Salmenniemi (2016: 7) refer 
to as 'technologies of subjugation that entail political strategies to regulate 
populations for optimal productivity' that in turn create 'spatio-temporal 
configurations where some populations are subjected to unjust regulations and 
confinement, while others circulate with ease, where some knowledge flows 
freely ... yet other epistemologies are constrained or rendered invisible’.  
 
Such depictions of neoliberalism and precarity suggest a severe limiting of 
options for opposition, particularly for the increasingly precarious worker. 
However, Lambert argues that neoliberalism obscures strategic choices that are 
available and there is a need to examine where spaces of social agency can be 
found and how they can be effectively used (Lambert, 2013). As such, he argues 
that unions accommodate neoliberalism and therefore need to be reminded that 
markets are social and ideological constructs.  While campaigns such as that of 
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the Justice for Janitors has an almost ‘mythic status’ as a successful example of 
bottom-up organising, it is less clear if such a method of organising can be 
extended as a template more broadly particularly as it remained embedded 
within a large multi-national union and is complicated by internal power 
dynamics and issues of scale (Savage, 2006: 645; Aguiar and Ryan, 2009). 
However, Aguiar and Ryan (2009) argue that the model has potential because it 
is open to interpretation and flexible despite challenges and contradictions. 
Blyton and Jenkins (2013), in their comparison of oppositions efforts in two 
similar factory closures assert that effective mobilization is possible but, to be 
sustained, the opposition must have broad social support within the local 
community. However, as seen in the case study discussed below, garnering this 
broader support can be difficult when workers must contend with a sustained 
campaign of negative portrayals. Additionally, as described above, precarious 
labour complicates union participation when workers are classed as 
independent contractors. As this is commonly the case within the taxi industry, 
one common alternative is workers cooperatives. While this structure is very 
different from the one presented in this case study, Darr’s (1999) work on taxi 
cooperatives in Israel highlighted similar sources of conflict amongst drivers as 
was found amongst the drivers in Philadelphia further underscoring the 
difficulties of cooperation within such a heterogeneous workforce. While 
organising precarious workers presents different challenges from more 
traditional forms of organising, Herod and Lambert (2016: 24) argue that 
workers and academics ‘should not succumb to the neoliberal fallacy that there 
is no alternative but to accept their condition’. 
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Methods and sources 
 
This article is based on a longitudinal/historical case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Rowlinson, Hassard, and Decker 2014). The data 
presented is used to illuminate the conceptual and thematic aspects of the case. 
The data that has been gathered is 'found evidence' (Fischer, 1995) purposefully 
constructed from multiple documentary sources, and interviews, to provide the 
facts from which a narrative has been constructed. According to the norms of 
both historical research (Marwick, 1970; Jordanova, 2006) and qualitative 
research using documents (Bowen, 2009), the texts used are evaluated with 
reference to their authorial intent and biases (i.e., source criticism). The 
documentary evidence comes primarily from press reportage, and government 
and court documents. Background data has come through contemporaneous 
interviews and discussions with TWA organizers, in particular with Ronald 
Blount, President of the Taxi Workers Alliance of Pennsylvania. Meetings were 
held with Blount and Tekle Gebremdhin (a TWA-PA organizer and driver) in 
December 2006, with Blount, Gebremdhin and Steve Chervenka (also a TWA-PA 
organizer and driver) in July 2007 and with Blount in January 2008. Data taken 
from the interviews has been triangulated with publicly available court and 
government documents. In our treatment of the evidence we have avoided 
personalizing the debate about the TWA through the use of direct quotes from 
the drivers. Instead we have focused upon the processes entangled within the 
dispute between drivers and the PPA. Aware of the critique that there is 'any 
such thing as historical truth or objectivity' (Evans, 2001: 3) we have 
nonetheless tried to keep to Jordanova's injunction to maintain 'the highest 
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levels of accuracy' while noting 'the provisional nature of [historical] knowledge' 
(Jordanova, 2006: 89). Thus, we make an 'attempt to re-create the past on the 
basis of imperfect and fragmentary evidence' (Marwick 1970: 131), while at the 
same time acknowledging our narration and interpretation as authors. 
 
The article covers the period 2004 to 2011. As with any historically situated 
study there are authorial choices made in regard of when to begin and stop the 
narrative. Some periodological choices are defined by epochs, while other 
periods map to the individual or organizational evidence that is available, in so 
doing helping to 'organize our thoughts' about the subject under research 
(Jordanvoa, 2006: 107). In this case the dates selected reflect events that book-
end the story that we explore here.  In 2004 the regulation of taxicabs was 
moved from the Pennsylvania Utility Commission to the Philadelphia Parking 
Authority, who began to pursue a stronger regulatory role. In turn this led to the 
formation of the TWA in 2005. Following disputes that led to the courts striking 
down the powers of the PPA that in turn led to a 'regulatory void' (see below), 
this ended in 2011 with legal ruling that re-established legitimate authority to 
regulate the tax-cab industry, as well as the recognition of the TWA by the AFL-
CIO. Thus, the period in between can be seen as a distinct period within which 
the struggle between the PPA and the TWA played out to a narrative conclusion.  
 
Philadelphia, post-industrial city 
 
Once a prominent industrial centre, Philadelphia suffered during the transition 
to a post-industrial modern city. A sharp decline in manufacturing jobs and 
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population in the second half of the 20th century was accompanied with an 
increase in crime and a reputation for corrupt governance (Simon and Alnutt, 
2007). The perception of Philadelphia as crumbling, corrupt and plagued by 
violence and racial tensions held back revitalization efforts for decades. Projects 
to revive Center City Philadelphia began in the 1980s but did not take off until 
the 1990s when Mayor Ed Rendell (who, afterwards became Governor of the 
State of Pennsylvania from 2003-2011) began to aggressively tackle the city’s 
problems (Simon and Alnutt, 2007). From the onset of his administration, 
Rendell ‘envisioned a broad reshaping of the city’s economy to reap benefits 
from tourism’ as a way to ‘counter the continuing decline in industrial 
employment’ (Simon and Alnutt, 2007: 412-413). Sanitizing the tourist and 
service economies of Philadelphia by making them literally cleaner and more 
orderly and efficient became a central component of the urban renewal project. 
The Center City District, established in 1990 (Center City, n.d.), is considered to 
be one of the most successful Business Improvement Districts in the USA (Simon 
and Alnutt, 2007). The emphasis on cleanliness is made explicit in a Center City 
District report that includes a survey on ‘Perceptions of Cleanliness’ with an 
emphasis on cleaning sidewalks and removing graffiti (Center City, 2007). 
Rendell’s successor as mayor of Philadelphia—John Street—, continued and 
expanded many of these programmes and, in addition, initiated a number of 
technology-based programmes which were largely unsuccessful including an 
attempt in 2004 to make Philadelphia the first wireless city (Tedeschi, 2004) and 
the installation of surveillance cameras which were hindered by a lack of 
bandwidth and a weak signal (Kase, 2010). The urban renewal process in 
Philadelphia followed a similar pattern to that described by Roy Coleman (2003: 
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26) where the city assumes a theme park character while ‘initiatives around 
social control [play] their part in attempting to homogenize the perceptions, uses 
and experiences of city centre space’. It is as a component of this process that 




Before 2005, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission regulated the taxicab 
industry in Philadelphia, despite its primary role of regulating Pennsylvania's 
electricity and gas companies. A handful of employees monitored an industry of 
1600 taxicabs and 5000 drivers (Ney, 2009). While the regulator’s function was 
to ensure that the drivers, dispatchers and owners worked together effectively, 
the PUC, seen as ineffective and corrupt, rarely intervened in disputes and, thus, 
drivers went fourteen years without a fare increase (Parker, 2005).  
 
In 2004, Ed Rendell—by this point governor of the state of Pennsylvania—
transferred the regulation of the taxicab industry to the Philadelphia Parking 
Authority (PPA) who introduced an expansive programme to clean up the 
industry the following year. They raised fares but they also dramatically 
increased fees and fines for violations and employed a team of inspectors who 
patrolled the city. Drivers complained of harassment and intimidation by the 
inspectors. Racial tensions increased as drivers were predominantly minorities 
and inspectors predominantly white males. Drivers could be fined between $100 
and $350 (depending on whether or not it was a 1st, 2nd or 3rd offence) for dirty 
vehicles, unmatching hubcaps, talking on their mobile or not wearing a collared 
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shirt (Philadelphia Parking Authority, 2011b). Along with increased physical 
monitoring, the PPA introduced a ‘Technology Enhancement Project’ which 
included installing credit card machines and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) in 
all cabs. With the credit card transactions and the GPS, the PPA was able to 
gather a large amount of data including every fare, how much every driver made, 
how many hours they worked, as well as the location, direction, speed and status 
of every vehicle - even when they were not working. The system also enabled the 
PPA to remotely lock and unlock doors and prevent the ignition to disable 
vehicles with outstanding fees and/or fines (Taxitronic Inc., n.d.).  
 
These changes were introduced with no public debate or input from the drivers 
(see Blount v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 2007). It appeared that, in effect, a 
government regulatory body had quietly taken over a private industry. The PPA 
profited through fines, fees and credit card surcharges. It was able to control the 
vehicles and the manner in which they were dispatched but without any of the 
risks or costs associated with the industry which remained with the owners 
(who bought and maintained vehicles and medallions) and the drivers. Drivers 
assumed the majority of the financial risks and because they were classified as 
independent contractors rather than employees of either the firm owners or the 
regulator, they received none of the standard benefits nor stability of formal 
employee status. The vast majority did not have healthcare (Taxi Workers 
Alliance, 2008). Drivers paid lease fees to the owners which were flat rates 
rather than a percentage of earnings (Thompson, 2008). In addition, they paid 
the PPA a service fee for the GPS system, paid for the supplies of the credit card 
machine and paid a surcharge to the PPA for the processing of credit card 
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payments (Ney, 2009). Drivers began shifts already significantly in debt with no 
guarantee of earnings. The taxicab industry in Philadelphia quickly shifted from 
one that was loosely regulated to becoming one of the most strictly regulated 




Critical of the increased range and cost of fines and the heavy-handed tactics of 
the inspectors, the drivers were particularly upset by the introduction of GPS 
and the tracking of drivers. 
 
As a driver when I come out in the morning and get my cup of coffee they 
follow me… In the afternoon, if I want to go to an AA (Alcoholics 
Anonymous) meeting or something they follow me and, in the evening, if I 
want to go to the mosque and pray they follow me. So, what happens is that 
I stop going to the mosque, I stop going to the AA meetings because I do not 
want them into my personal business and we think that effects the driver’s 
personal lifestyle (Blount quoted in Inskeep, 2006).  
 
Beyond the issues of privacy, drivers felt de-professionalized by a system that 
seemingly superseded their tacit knowledge of the city. They were fined $350 for 
not adhering to the route suggested by the GPS (Philadelphia Parking Authority, 
2006) despite the fact that the GPS system did not contain information regarding 
changing traffic patterns, accidents or construction. The GPS signal was blocked 
by the tall buildings and was outdated, directing drivers to a sports stadium that 
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had been demolished two years prior (Volk, 2007). Further, the drivers opposed 
the particular system which was introduced because it did not improve and 
centralize the dispatch system which could have made the dispatching of cabs 
fairer (Volk, 2007). While the PPA had introduced an extensive technologically 
based monitoring system focused on micro-managing the drivers, it did not 
address problems in the industry with which technology could be used to make 
the industry fairer and more efficient. To promote the programme to the public 
the PPA used an expensive public relations company with a retainer of $10,000 a 
month to manage the public portrayal of the changes (Kase, 2012). Within this 
media portrayal the GPS system was sold to the public to prevent them from 
being ‘gouged’ (McDonald, 2006) or ‘taken advantage of’ because of drivers ‘who 
are problems’ (Volk, 2007). In so doing, the GPS was sold to the public by 
constructing the drivers as potential con-men that needed to be monitored in 
order to protect the interest of consumers. 
 
In 2005 a group of drivers organized to lobby for a fare increase and oppose the 
Technology Enhancement Project with a focus on the introduction of GPS and the 
credit card machines. Historically, there had been a ‘Brotherhood of Taxi 
Worker’s’ which somewhat functioned as a union but was considered to be 
ineffective and problematic because it consisted of both drivers and owners 
despite their conflicting interests (Taxi Workers Alliance, 2007a). Inspired by 
and in conjunction with the Taxi Workers Alliance of New York City the group of 
drivers formed a Philadelphia chapter to be named ‘Taxi Workers Alliance of 
Pennsylvania’. The driver-organizers faced significant difficulties in gathering 
support amongst the diverse group of 5000 drivers in Philadelphia. First, there 
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were many different types of drivers (part-time, full-time, night drivers, day 
drivers, owner-operators, those who only worked the train station or airport, 
etc.) and they historically had little contact with each other (Mathew, 2005). 
Secondly, the diversity extended beyond the professional circumstances as the 
drivers were predominantly new immigrants from at least forty different 
nations, different religions and different ethnic groups (Shukur, 2010 and Diulio, 
2011). There were prejudicial attitudes between different ethnic groups and a 
distrust and skepticism towards the African-American driver-organizers 
(Thompson, 2008). Third, drivers were skeptical that the ‘Alliance’ would offer 
an improved representation over the ‘Brotherhood’ as drivers had been paying 
dues for years to the Brotherhood without visible results. Fourth, as a group of 
independent contractors it was difficult to convince the drivers that there would 
be any personal benefits to working together with other drivers. Though poorly 
paid and with many health and crime risks, drivers often justified their 
occupational choice by highlighting the ‘independence’ of the job (Mathew, 
2005). Forming a collective body was, in some ways, counter to the perceived 
culture of taxicab drivers as they worked primarily on their own with self-
measured interaction between customers and other drivers. All of these 
difficulties specific to the taxicab industry were also within a context of declining 
union participation more broadly. Despite this, those involved in the Taxi 
Workers Alliance of Philadelphia were optimistic and considered themselves as 
pioneers working to improve labour relations for future generations and for the 





After successfully lobbying for a fare increase, the newly formed Taxi Workers 
Alliance of Philadelphia opposed the Philadelphia Parking Authority in a number 
of ways. First, they filed a lawsuit alleging that the PPA did not go through the 
proper process of presenting the proposal to the public (Blount v. Philadelphia 
Parking Authority, 2006). This lawsuit was filed in the state court and was 
rejected because the state court determined that the PPA was a city regulator. 
This issue dragged on for years and in 2009, a similar lawsuit was filed in the city 
courts which was again rejected because the city court determined that the PPA 
was under the state jurisdiction (Blount et al. v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 
2009). 
 
In addition, the drivers organized a number of strikes. In 2006 there was a strike 
with 98% of drivers participating and included a rally at City Hall (Shukur, 2010 
and Taxi Workers Alliance, 2007a). The PPA permitted taxicabs from the 
suburbs to work the city that day and dismissed the strike as ineffective (Volk, 
2007). In early 2007 a spontaneous strike was held after inspectors attempted to 
tow the cab of a driver who refused to accept credit card payments at the airport. 
Television crews arrived to film the scenes of the driver being pulled from his car 
and arrested (Taxi Workers Alliance, 2007b). Because the incident occurred at 
the airport the PPA filed charges against the Eritrean driver under the Patriot Act 
suggesting that it was an act of terror (Thompson, 2008). Later in 2007, the 
TWA-Pennsylvania joined with the TWA-NYC for a two-day strike. Press 
coverage focused on how little impact the strike made in either city (Solomon, 
2007). The drivers in Philadelphia, as a result, ended the strike a day early. 
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When, in 2007, drivers refused to comply with orders to use credit card 
machines, the PPA enacted an ‘executive order’ and increased fines and penalties 
for non-compliance (Sule v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 2010). Further, the 
PPA sought to isolate the drivers and TWA organizers specifically. The driver 
who was pulled from his car, that he owned, at the airport was a TWA organizer. 
The PPA sought to counteract the negative publicity of the televised violent 
scenes and crying driver by evoking the Patriot Act and connecting the drivers to 
discourses of immigration and terrorism. In 2008 a female passenger accused 
the President of the TWA, Ronald Blount, of assault after an alleged dispute 
about paying by credit card. Blount was arrested at PPA headquarters amid 
reported cheers from PPA staff (Wolfson and Velis, 2010). After Blount was 
exonerated of the charges, the PPA again tried him on the same charges within 
their Administrative Court where he was again found to be not guilty (Wolfson, 
2010). In 2010, continuing the campaign to tie drivers with negative discourses 
on immigration, the PPA invited twenty-six drivers to the PPA offices where they 
were questioned by ICE immigration agents with four being detained 
(Thompson, 2010). ICE agents stated that the investigation was because drivers 
had access to parts of the airport beyond the general public with an implicit 
suggestion of terrorism (Thompson, 2010). Blount highlighted that four out of 
six thousand drivers did not constitute a problem. 
 
Initially, the members of the TWA sought to garner public support for their 
efforts to oppose GPS and to tie their privacy dispute to customers who could 
also be monitored since the PPA could match their credit card details to a 
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particular trip (Volk, 2007 and Campisi, 2010). Drivers pointed out that the 
government was now able to track their trips to, for example, a strip club or an 
abortion clinic (Inskeep, 2006). However, these efforts did not succeed in 
countering the alternative narrative publicized by the PPA that the GPS system 
functioned to protect consumers from dishonest drivers (Ney, 2009). The drivers 
were more successful when they shifted the focus away from their own 
experiences and, instead, called for greater scrutiny of the PPA more broadly. 
The PPA was also the agency that handed out parking tickets and, as such, were 
disliked by the general public. Further, as a component of the transfer of the 
Philadelphia Parking Authority from the city to the state the Philadelphia 
Parking Authority was supposed to provide the revenue from parking tickets and 
taxi fines back to the city to fund the public schools. The city and state 
governments became involved in a bitter dispute over this issue (City of 
Philadelphia v. Rendell, 2005 and City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Parking 
Authority, 2003) which continued for years and which the TWA sought to 
capitalize on in their own disputes against the PPA. The TWA campaigned for the 
city’s demand for an independent financial audit of the PPA (General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania, 2007) which exposed numerous faults in how the PPA handled its 
revenue which, thus, further tarnished the image of the PPA amongst the general 
public in Philadelphia (Kerkstra, 2009).  
 
The TWA also gained more traction when they were able to consolidate and align 
efforts more closely with the taxicab companies and owners. While they had 
initially split from the ‘Brotherhood’ because of conflicting interests between 
drivers and owners, they later re-linked the two sides of the industry with the 
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Unified Taxi Workers of Pennsylvania in 2008. The companies and owners were 
similarly opposed to the extensive micro-managing of the PPA and the 
administration of fines. The two groups began a number of lawsuits both 
together and separately to challenge the authority of the PPA (Blount v. 
Philadelphia Parking Authority, 2006; Blount et al. v. Philadelphia Parking 
Authority, 2009; Sule v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 2010 and Germantown 
Cab Co. V. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 2010). These lawsuits demanded 
further clarification of the role and jurisdiction of the PPA. The case with 
Germantown Cab Company and Sule questioned the legitimacy of the PPA and 
determined that the regulations were void and unenforceable (Philadelphia 
Parking Authority, 2010). 
 
Following the 2010 court ruling there was a period of 'regulatory void' when it 
was unclear what powers the PPA had to regulate the taxi-cabs. This was 
resolved in 2011 when the public regulations were published by the PPA in the 
fall of that year. In these ordinances, the requirement to have GPS was 
maintained. In addition, drivers were also required to possess a paper map, just 




The context in which the transformation of the taxi industry was enacted 
demonstrates the complex connections between the working lives of individuals 
and the neoliberal ideologies of urban renewal. The urban renewal process of the 
city involved not only the regulation of public spaces but, also, of the individuals 
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who worked in these public spaces in the service industries. This requirement 
for cleanliness becomes ‘a catch-all category under which problems of 
marketing, environmental improvements and street safety become conflated’ 
(Coleman, 2003: 24). There is a parallel between the city and the individual in 
this process of urban renewal. The means of cleaning up the city was both actual 
(through urban beautification projects) and subjugating, conflated with the use 
of monitoring to make it more palatable for tourists and consumers. Similarly, 
attempts to sanitise the taxi industry were both actual (fining drivers for dirty 
cars, not wearing a collared shirt and having mismatched hubcaps) and 
subjugating, conflated with the use of GPS monitoring to make the industry more 
palatable for tourists and consumers. As such, the regulation of the individual 
(Alvesson and Willmott, 2002) is connected to the broader processes and 
tensions of urban renewal. Surveillance works alongside aims of creating ‘a 
visually pleasing city’ and ‘reinforces regenerative claims made for the city 
space’ (Coleman, 2005: 141-142). However, these ‘urban electronic 
infrastructures’ both regulate and restrict the urban environment (Lyon, 2007: 
97). The regulation of the service industries for tourist consumption also 
restricts the behaviours of users and, more importantly, those who carry out the 
labour in these spaces. Encroachment on privacy is understood as a trade-off for 
safety. 
 
In the case of Philadelphia, the taxicab drivers’ issues were intrinsically tied up 
with disputes and frictions regarding the urban renewal process. The 
complicated power struggle between the city and state governments over who 
was best suited to regulate the city services and, perhaps, a desire by the 
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governor to see to the end processes he began as mayor, functioned to further 
disadvantage the drivers as actors. Their dispute was a small component within 
a much broader dispute involving more powerful actors. The city government 
did not offer public assistance to, endorsement of, or comment on, the plight of 
the taxicab drivers. However, the city government did accept assistance from the 
drivers within the context of the city’s dispute with the PPA when the drivers 
assisted in lobbying efforts demanding an independent financial audit of the PPA.  
 
The taxicab drivers interpreted the increased regulation as a degradation of their 
labour and, with the GPS in particular, as a component of de-professionalization.  
The monitoring in the form of the physical human harassment by PPA inspectors 
and the silent, always on, presence of GPS were understood as symbols of 
distrust and as elements of a broader plan to negatively portray drivers as a 
means to justify the regulation and to counter negative feedback. The PPA 
capitalised on stereotypes of drivers as con-men and incorporated the broader 
othering of immigrant labourers placing drivers within the context and 
discourses of anti-immigrant sentiment and fears of terrorism. The PPA hired a 
public relations company and the negative portrayal of drivers escalated as the 
driver opposition and non-compliance intensified and as the TWA gained 
increasing legitimacy amongst drivers and the public.  
 
There are three instances of the PPA capitalising on circumstances to portray the 
drivers as violent and illegal as a means of implicitly justifying the use of 
surveillance monitoring in the interest of public safety in addition to consumer 
protection. While the PPA did not explicitly link these events to the installation of 
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GPS in the taxicabs, they functioned to discredit the drivers and TWA organisers 
in particular. First, when a TWA organiser refused to comply with the executive 
order requiring the use of credit card machines there was a publicised standoff 
between inspectors. They PPA responded by invoking the Patriot Act with the 
implicit suggestion of terrorism. Though the charges were later dismissed, the 
insinuation was made of the drivers as potential security threats. The second 
concerns how the PPA handled the charges of assault of a customer by the 
president of the TWA, Ronald Blount. He was arrested in the PPA offices in front 
of cameras and reportedly among cheers by PPA staff. The event and charges 
were widely publicised locally. When found not guilty in the courts, the PPA 
prolonged the episode by trying him again through their own disciplinary 
mechanisms even though he was, again, found to be not guilty. The event 
tarnished the reputation of Blount, put him out of work for a prolonged period, 
and damaged the legitimacy of the TWA while also reinforcing the perception of 
potential risk to public safety by the drivers. Finally, the media spectacle of the 
raid by immigration agents of drivers within PPA offices is a further example of a 
publicised media event organised, promoted or prolonged by the PPA to portray 
the drivers as potentially dangerous or illegal. These actions fall far outside of 
the normal remit of the regulator whose role is to merely to ensure that the 
different parts of the industry work together effectively and fairly. They used the 
media and abused their power and the role of their own court to manufacture 




While the imposition of GPS was legitimised through safety concerns and 
consumer protection, the use of the technology de-professionalised the drivers. 
GPS works as a form of ‘augmented space’ overlaying the physical space with a 
digital representation (Manovich, 2006). These systems have the potential to 
change ‘forms of visibility by informationalizing space’ producing ‘new templates 
for decision making’ that implicitly challenge the nature of expertise (Thrift and 
French, 2002: 325). However, these systems are always ‘selective, incomplete, 
biased and subjective’ and there is a concern as to how they are used to 
‘transform the way that we establish meaning, construct knowledge and make 
sense of our surroundings’ (Mitchell, 2003: 120). In the case of Philadelphia, the 
systems installed were out-of-date and often inaccurate. Drivers were directed to 
buildings which no longer existed and recommended long circuitous routes to 
nearby locations. Further, these systems must ‘negotiate the architectures of 
spaces that they attempt to inhabit’ and consist of ‘ebbs and flows’ and ‘troughs 
and peaks’ (Matt Locke in Manovich, 2006: 228). The GPS system was disrupted 
by the tall buildings of Philadelphia and the system had a delay which meant that 
cabs were not where it read them to be. Drivers were required to adhere to a 
digital representation of the city that was flawed, inaccurate, incomplete and 
static. The system neglected the dynamic nature of urban traffic patterns and did 
not account for traffic, construction nor the particular uses of space (such as 
streets dominated by pedestrians). Drivers were subjugated to ’the rule of the 
machine’ (Meyer, 2008: 152) and their own expertise was discounted. Tacit 
knowledge accrued through experience and their lay understanding of the 
rhythms and patterns of the city street were devalued. The labour was 
dehumanised and mechanised as they were instructed to follow the path of the 
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digital representation, regardless of the flaws. Further, the imposition of GPS 
infringed upon the autonomy and independence of the taxicab drivers which was 
a significant feature which many drivers embraced about their positions. The use 
of the technology had the dual function of monitoring the drivers and deskilling 
their labour. It was, therefore what McCormack and Salmenniemi (2016) 
describe as a 'technology of subjugation'. In this way, this case demonstrates 
how regulatory interventions can impact upon the employee’s self-construction 
of identity as a mechanism of control (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002).  
 
The transformation and regulation of the taxicab industry in Philadelphia is not 
exclusively a narrative of subjugation but, also, a case study which illustrates the 
complexity of regulatory systems, surveillance technologies and practices of 
resistance as aspects of, and responses to, neoliberalism. The complexity of 
resistance is often ignored as well as the tensions between ‘resistance and 
accommodation’ which highlight the ‘social and interactional nature of 
resistance’ and connect to debates about ‘power and control and the relationship 
between individuals and social context’ (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004: 550). 
The formation and eventual legitimising recognition of the Taxi Workers Alliance 
of Pennsylvania demonstrates the difficulties, complexities and the possibilities 
of resistance within precarious industries.  
 
There are three ways to understand the difficulties the TWA encountered in their 
efforts to challenge and resist the PPA. First, there were difficulties narrowly 
specific to the circumstances within this industry at this particular moment in 
Philadelphia. Second, there were issues that were connected to the taxicab 
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industry more generally. Third, they faced difficulties emblematic of broader 
issues of precarious labour. They were triply disadvantaged in their position. In 
the first instance, resistance was hindered by the historical weakness and 
negative perception of the ‘Brotherhood’, and the general decline in organized 
labour. More significantly, they were hindered by the ambiguity of the legitimacy 
and jurisdiction of the regulator. They were contesting the regulator while, 
simultaneously, the city government was in dispute with the state government 
and the regulator over issues of jurisdiction and distribution of revenue.  
 
In the second instance, efforts of collective resistance are difficult within the 
taxicab industry. The recruitment to collective action is complicated by the 
isolated and independent nature of the labour and then further complicated by 
the wide diversity of the workforce in terms of classification of labour and 
ethnicity (sometimes carrying prejudices with them when they immigrate such 
as tensions between Indian and Pakistani drivers as documented by Mathew, 
2005). The different forms of drivers, particularly between hire drivers and 
owner-operators, can be viewed as having competing interests because of the 
differences in investment, costs and risks associated with owning or not owning 
their own vehicle. Donald Anderson (2012) describes how the ambiguous role of 
drivers complicated debates concerning the introduction of cameras in taxicabs 
in San Francisco. The independent, dispersed and mobile nature of the labour 
results in circumstances where there are loose ties between individuals in the 
industry. The burden to establish meaningful connections and to instil a sense of 
solidarity amongst united individuals is thus much more difficult within 
 27 
industries like the taxicab industry as compared with more traditionally strong 
unionised occupations such as factory workers. 
 
Third, many of the difficulties of establishing a collective body and organising 
effective resistance experienced by the taxicab drivers are emblematic of 
broader issues of precarious labour. Taxicab drivers were classified as 
‘independent contractors’ and not employees. As such, the drivers were limited 
in their ability to unionise (as demonstrated in this case study) and were 
hindered in their ability legally to carry out acts of collective resistance such as 
striking (Anderson, 2012). Their work is intrinsically precarious and through the 
organisation of the industry they assume all of the risk. While the owners and 
regulators fees are mandatory regardless of income, drivers began shifts in debt 
and were not guaranteed any level of income. Within the context of this case 
study these issues were exacerbated by the PPAs ability to demobilise vehicles 
thus controlling the drivers’ ability to work and further highlighting the risks of 
opposing the PPA rules. The labour is insecure and the power relations starkly 
unequal. While the conflicting interests between drivers and owners fits more 
closely with conventional understandings of labour disputes the additional role 
of the regulator means that the drivers were doubly discriminated against. The 
dispute over the jurisdiction and role of the PPA in regulating the industry 
demonstrated the ease in which regulators can insert themselves into an 
industry, expand their remit with minimal limitations and extract revenue from 
already burdened workers. Further, they can do so without offering anything in 
return to the labourers in the form of stability, insurance or protections.  
 
 28 
Because of their status as independent contractors, the taxicab drivers, along 
with other precarious labourers, struggled to gain recognition and support from 
traditional labour organisations. Despite earlier requests for assistance and 
advice, the Taxi Workers Alliance (named as an umbrella organisation 
encompassing both the New York City and Philadelphia branches) was not 
accepted into the AFL-CIO until 2011. In welcoming the organisation, the AFL-
CIO stated that the group was ‘ready’ to be accepted into the broader group 
despite the fact that the New York City chapter had formed in 1998 (AFL-CIO, 
2011). The AFL-CIO acknowledged that the collective bargaining power of 
taxicab drivers had been weakened by the classification of drivers as 
independent contractors. Further, they acknowledged that employers were 
increasingly intentionally misclassifying workers as independent contractors as 
a way of avoiding statutory commitments and unionisation (AFL-CIO, 2011).  
 
Other acts of resistance that challenged the legitimacy and reputation of the PPA 
were more covert. As such, this case study fits Real and Putnam’s (2005) 
depiction of resistance with multiple targets and of hybrid forms of resistance 
which link overt collective action with less visible opposition. Further, it can be 
understood as constituting ‘a set of discursive and non-discursive practices that 
are simultaneously enabling and constraining, coherent and contradictory, 
complex and simple, efficacious and ineffectual’ (Mumby, 2005: 38). Traditional 
explicit and overt practices such as striking were broadly ineffective. Challenging 
the regulator through the courts was somewhat successful but involved a 
realignment of the traditional owner-driver dispute (traditionally the role of the 
regulator had been to mediate between the taxicab company owners and the 
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hired drivers whereas, in this situation, the owners and drivers filed joint 
lawsuits against the regulator). Lobbying and campaigning, in conjunction with 
the city government, for an independent audit of the PPA was successful and, 
through the exposure of faulty practices, damaged the reputation of the PPA. 
Within this context, the drivers adopted and inverted the PPAs own discourse, 
attempting to appropriate the legitimacy of the dominant neoliberal discourse to 
achieve their own ends. They did this, for example, by demanding an audit of the 
PPA to appeal to consumer sensibilities. They also did this by aligning 
themselves within a broader network of activist groups responding to 
neoliberalism. They began working with the Media Mobilising Project which 
functioned as localised communication-based network that worked with a broad 
range of advocacy groups such as TWA to promote and support their efforts. The 
two groups shared office space and resources and the TWA benefitted from 
interactions with groups experienced with the use of alternative and social 
media within the context of social movements thus demonstrating ‘the crucial 
role that media play in sewing together groups and movements that face distinct 
but ultimately similar struggles against the neoliberalization of the city’ (Berger, 
Funke and Wolfson, 2011: 193). In summary, while the material and physical 
circumstances have little changed, the TWA succeeded in developing 
collaborations with other impacted actors and effectively fought discursively to 





The effectiveness of the Taxi Workers Alliance of Pennsylvania in their resistance 
to the introduction of GPS and what they understood as the excessive regulatory 
involvement of the PPA was largely unsuccessful with some elements of success. 
The TWA were at a structural disadvantage because of the precarious nature of 
their labour and their classification as independent contractors. Traditional acts 
of resistance were largely ineffective, evidence itself of the embeddedness of 
neoliberal patterns in the contemporary political economy. The impact of strikes 
was minimal because the PPA permitted out of town cabs to work the city on 
those days and because of the lack of public support for the strikes. Explicit acts 
of non-compliance were also largely ineffective because of the ability of the PPA 
to administer fines and disable vehicles. The lawsuits which challenged the 
jurisdiction and legitimacy of the PPA’s regulations were technically successful in 
that the owners and drivers were successful in arguing that the PPA’s regulations 
did not follow proper procedures. However, they did not fundamentally shift the 
structure nor transfer any more power or control towards the drivers as the PPA 
merely responded by enacting similar regulations appropriately. Nevertheless, 
the success for the drivers in these lawsuits were largely due to combining 
efforts with the cab owners. Both groups felt aggrieved by the PPA micro-
managing, whether as workers or business owners. This demonstrates the 
complex nature of the power relations in this context, and the changing (or 
changed) nature of post-Fordist/post-industrial capitalism. That is, where both 
labour and capital (or at least one element of capital in the form of the taxicab 
business owners) are subjugated to the needs of the system as a whole; whereby 
the owners of the taxi-cabs were drawn into the structures of subjugation 
alongside the taxi-drivers.  
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This speaks to Hanlon's (2016) notion that neoliberalism encourages the 
extraction of value "beyond the organization" in post-Fordist contexts. In this 
situation, the rent extracted from the labour (and by extension also from the 
capitalist-owners as well) was appropriated by the PPA acting on behalf of the 
interest of the system itself. This is, then, also a story of how managerial and 
political elites have absorbed power and used it to configure the systems of 
capitalist production to suit their own needs–there has been a separation of 
ownership and control, and indeed ownership and benefit. There is in this a 
similarity with the capture of the rents of finance capital through the process of 
financialization (Krippner, 2005), particularly through the mechanism whereby 
first-order risk is borne by investors and shareholders, and catastrophic risk is 
socialised, while the rewards of finance accrue to elites. The case of the taxi-cab 
drivers in Philadelphia in the period 2004-2011 should, therefore, be seen as 
part of a much broader trend within the contemporary political economy as a 
result of neoliberalism (see Maguire and Murphy, 2014 for an alternative 
example of neoliberalism and taxi regulation in Ireland). Indeed, the events 
narrated and discussed here are merely the prologue to the more recent 
transformation of the taxi-industry triggered by firms such as Uber and Lift, that 
follow the logic of post-Fordism, value extraction, de-professionalization and 
regulatory avoidance to their logical conclusion (Pettica-Harris, et al., 2018; 
Zwick, 2018). This case study also prefigures the complexities of resistance to 
the use of technology for regulation and how GPS, which becomes an integral 
aspect of ride-hailing apps, reconfigures how drivers understand their agency 
within the profession. The implementation and imposition of technology often 
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emerges as the site of contestation through which drivers develop means of 
working around and manipulating their ‘marginality and informality’ (Chen, 
2018). 
 
In conclusion, while this analysis is pessimistic, it is not fatalistic. This case study 
enables us to observe over time the increasing difficulties of resistance within 
the context of neoliberal regulation and increasingly precarious labour. 
Neoliberal systems adapt and continue to evolve particularly as the technology 
used advances. However, practices of resistance and structures of organising 
also evolve. Resistance, even if not wholly successful, opens up new terrains. This 
case study provides a small example of this as the drivers themselves, over time, 
constantly evolved and adapted their practices. They did not remain static but 
continued (and continue) to seek and gain further alliances. This case study is 
novel in part because the drivers did try so many different tactics. Within the 
context of concerted efforts of de-professionalisation and negative portrayals, 
they have established themselves as a strong and legitimate organisation within 
local politics. This case study functions as a prologue for subsequent 
developments within the gig economy as an illustration of both practices of 
control and of opportunities for collective action and resistance. 
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Appendix One: List of Actors and Organizations 
 
Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA): established by the Philadelphia City 
Council in 1950, in 2001 it moves to state control, in 2004 it becomes regulator of the 
Philadelphia taxicab industry 
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Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC): established in 1937, State 
(Commonwealth) regulator of a wide range of industries including the taxicab 
industry, in 2004 regulation of only the Philadelphia taxi industry (ie: not the taxi 
industry in the suburbs or anywhere else in the state) is moved to the Philadelphia 
Parking Authority 
 
Ed Rendell: Mayor of the city of Philadelphia between 1992-2000, Governor of the 
State of Pennsylvania between 2003 and 2011 
 
John Street: Mayor of the city of Philadelphia between 2000-2008 
 
Taxi Workers Alliance of Pennsylvania (TWA): established in 2005 as a non-profit 
organization, effectively functions as a union with members paying dues, however, at 
the time of forming the National Labor Board did not recognise organized 
independent contractors as a union 
 
Brotherhood of Unified Drivers and Owner Operators: organization of drivers and 
owner operators in Philadelphia from which the TWA splits off in 2005 
 
Unified Taxi Workers Alliance: in 2007 the TWA and the ‘Brotherhood’ merge into 
one organization but remains commonly referred to as TWA 
 
Center City District: formed by property-owners, commercial tenants and 
employers, and the City of Philadelphia in 1990 as a private-sector business 
improvement district in the city centre of Philadelphia, it is authorized under 
Pennsylvania’s Municipality Authorities Act (Center City District, n.d.) 
